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ECONOMIC NOTES f
BOOMS AND 
BUSTSC h a rle s  S ilv e r  uses his  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f M a rx 's  
analysis of the contradictions 
within the capitalist mode of 
production to explain the 
history of the Australian post­
war trade cycle in boom and 
bust.
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In the 1970s capitalism entered a new 
stage. There were fluctations in income 
and employment during the long boom  
o f the 1950s, 60s. But the overall trend 
was for rapid economic growth. Since 
1970 fluctuations such as the present 
crisis take place within an overall trend to 
r e la t iv e  s ta g n a t io n .  W hy? T h e  
explanation is important for the 
immediate policy area and for the future 
o f capitalism. In today's conditions more 
people see the need for change.
I begin with Marx's explanation of 
economic crisis. The impact of changes in 
capitalism since 1867 are discussed later.
M arx on contradictions and 
crises 1
For Marx, the compelling force in the 
capitalist mode of production is the 
production o f surlus value (profit) on an 
ever expanding scale. Surplus value 
becoming money capital, must be 
rein vested . The sav in g-in v estm en t 
process is central to expansion, and to the 
accumulation o f huge quantities of 
extremely efficient instruments of 
production. At times this process leads to 
long booms. But, overall, the capitalist 
system is unplanned and motivated by 
private profit; so at other times the 
saving-investment process leads to 
periods o f stagnation such as in the 1930s 
and the 1970s, and economic crises as at 
present. The same factors explain 
short term fluctuations, and long-term or 
secular trends.
Two basic features of the capitalist 
mode o f production are pursued in order 
to increase the rate of profit, and thus the 
accumulation of capital. They are 
interrelated; together they create a 
barrier to the accumulation of capital at 
its earlier rate.
The first trend is described by Dean 
J orgen so n , a Harvard econ om ist:
"Traditionally businessmen faced with 
investment decisions have chosen to 
emphasise spending on machines and 
o t h e r  c a p i t a l  e q u ip m e n t  o v e r  
manpower." The capitalist mode of 
production has brought about an 
u n ,... •! nted ex p a n sio n  o f  "the 
productive powers o f society". We know 
that with computers, etc. this process is 
continuing at an accelerating rate.
The second trend, implied above, is 
that because of greed for accumulation 
and profit, capitalists have always 
attempted to restrict the rate of growth in 
wages and salaries: human needs are a 
cost in the capitalist mode o f production.
But this is only the first "act" in the 
process of capitalist production. After 
surplus value has been produced the 
whole product must be sold profitably or 
the capitalist will lose a part or all o f the 
capital. Surplus value must be "realised" 
through profitable sales.
The conditions under which surplus 
value is produced become a barrier to 
continued expansion. At the point of 
p rod u ction , ex p an d in g  p rod u ctive  
capacity means that an increasing 
volume o f goods and services is thrown 
onto the market if available resources are 
fully utilised. This requires a rapidly 
expanding market. But greed for 
accumulation also ensures that wages 
and salaries will rise less rapidly than 
investment and productive capacity. 
Wages and salaries are the basis of 
consumer spending which, in turn, is the 
largest item in the demand for goods and 
services.
It follows that after the initial stimulus 
w h ich  a c c o m p a n ie s  in v e s t m e n t ,  
consumer demand- will rise less rapidly 
than productive capacity and output. 
Again, as much o f the output o f the 
capital goods industries is produced to 
increase productive capacity in the 
co n su m er  g o o d s  in d u s tr ie s  any  
continuing decline in the rate o f increase
_________________ ALR W inter 83 ^
in consumption spending will reduce the 
demand for capital goods as well.
Marx sums up: "But to the extent that 
the productive power develops, it finds 
itself at variance with the narrow basis on 
which the condition o f consumption 
rest(s)". Here, Marx had in mind the 
trade cycle where boom s have always led 
to crises o f over-production expressed in 
an "excess" o f people, an "excess" of 
capital, and an "excess" o f goods.
With the experience o f the early 1930s, 
and from a very different standpoint, 
Keynes was coAperned with a much more 
serious problem for the future of  
capitalism than the trade cycle. He 
argued that with laissez-faire capitalism, 
the millions o f unemployed in the 1930s 
reflected a chronic contradiction which 
had developed between productive 
capacity and consumption.
Both Marx and Keynes argued that if 
expansion is to continue in a capitalist 
economy there has to be a parallel 
development o f the major sectors of the 
economy such as productive capacity 
(investment) and consumer demand. 
They agreed that given private enterprise, 
productive capacity will expand much 
more rapidly than consumer demand 
thus leading to "excess" capacity. Marx 
saw Capital's exploitation of labour as 
the basic reason for this contradiction.Are there contradictory rates of 
d e v e lo p m e n t b e tw een  p ro d u c tiv e  
capacity and consumption in the postwar 
period? If so, does this help to explain 
short-term fluctuations in income and 
employment and the development of the 
new stage in capitalism after 1970?
Short term fluctations: the 
trade cycle
The trade cycle with recovery and 
boom followed by crisis and recession 
has always been a feature o f capitalism.
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A t the April Economic Summit a clash 
developed among employers with 
mining and banking interests taking a 
hard line based on reduced wages to 
restore profits while the embattled 
m an u fac tu ring  in d u stry  were 
sympathetic to an expansionary policy 
and were willing to compromise on 
wages.
Why?
Statistics in Table A for two of the seven 
cycles since 1949-50 help to answer this 
q u e stio n 2, w ith 1952-53 and the 
September quarter 1982 (for 1982-83) 
being the crisis years.
A glance at Table A shows that in both 
cycles investment outlays, for example 
on machinery, are bunched together, and 
at very high levels in the recovery-early 
boom phase o f the cycle. Thus gross 
private investment (GP1) increased by 
18 percent in 1949-50 and 17 percent in 
1980-81. These sharp increases in 
productive capacity required parallel 
increases in demand. In fact in 1949-50 
consumer demand rose by 6.3 percent 
while in 1980-81 it rose by only 3.7 
percent. One reason for the relatively 
slow growth in consumer spending was 
the slow growth, relative to GPI, in 
average earnings — 1.3 percent in 1949- 
50 and 4.7 percent in 1980-81. And these 
are pre-tax earnings!
Why the actual crisis? In the pre-crisis 
year productive capacity is still positive 
so productive capacity is at its peak. But 
in this year there is always a decline in the 
rate o f increase in consumer spending 
(see column 3 in Table A on this point).
Column 7 in Table A shows that the
decline in the rate o f increase in consumer 
spending in the pre-crisis year is partly 
due to the decline in the rate o f increase in 
average earnings in that year. In their 
attempt to maintain profit levels Column 
8 shows the CPI as rising sharply in the 
pre-crisis year — a factor in the decline in 
the rate of increase o f average earnings 
and consumer spending in the pre-crisis 
year.
The result of high levels of productive 
capacity and a decline in the rate of 
consumer spending in the pre-crisis year 
could only be an unplanned increase in 
the level o f stocks — see Column 6 of 
Table A. Excess capacity relative to 
demand precipitated the 1952-53 crisis 
and with a decline in the overseas 
demand for Australian minerals the crisis 
of 1982-83.
Hence the relevance o f the ALP's pre­
election economic program to "embrace 
the policies of expansion" — and the 
danger in policies that put the emphasis 
on "sacrifice" in areas o f human need.
Stages in the development o f 
capitalism
We now come to the long term stages 
in capitalist development. The second 
world war brought the 1930s depression 
to an end. The war was followed by the 
long boom of the 1950s and 60s. Four 
economic crises during this period 
showed that there were still tendencies to 
over-production. Why the overall 
expansion? In the 1950s and 60s there 
were offsetting factors to the trend in 
m onopoly capitalism to stagnation. 
P ost-w ar recon stru ction , a larger  
government sector, and for Australia 
rapid industrialisation and high levels of 
migration were the basis of the overall 
expansion during the long boom. 
Particularly in th e 'U S A  rising arms 
expenditure absorbed much of the. v 
"surplus" that arises with the capitalist
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Year
1949-50
1950-51
1951-52
1952-53
c o n s ta n t p ric e s  19 4 9 -5 0  and 1980 ”81 — S e p te m b e r q u a rte r 19 8 2 . 
U s u a lly  th e  c o lu m n s  s h o w  p e rc e n ta g e  in c re a s e  o v e r  p re v io u s  y e a r.
%
increase 
real GDP
7.4
5.3
2.9
- 1.1
increase
cons'ptn
spending
6.3
7.2
- 1.1
- 2.2
4 5 6 7 8 9
% % % % % increase Company
increase increase Increase in increase consumer income
gross private employ­ stock levels earnings price index as % of
investment ment average GDP
18.0 3.2 48 1.3 8.4 11.80
18.9 4.5 156 5.4 13.0 13.04
4.9 1.2 421 0.3 22.5 11.39
-7.7 -3.2 -306 0.2 9.4 10.61
17.0 2.6 552 4.74 8.8 12.26
13.0 1.2 910 3.03 10.7 11.51
-6.5 0.1 -118 0.5 3.5 9.4
1980-81
1981-81 
Sept. qr '82
3.7
3.0
- 0.6
3.71
2.45
- 0.6
Ta b le  B: R a te s  o f in c re a s e  in in v e s tm e n t and c o n su m p tio n  
during the long boom  in v a rio u s  c o u n trie s .
Country Year Investment Consp'tn
24 OECD 1950 as % of GDP as % of
countries 1970 GDP
Australia 1948-49 18.0 70.73
1970-71 23.8 60.20
18.30 70.73
Japan 1950 26.09 60.53
1970 17 61.00
35 51.00
South Korea (2) 1953 8 82
1976 26 65
(1 ) A u stra lia 's  gross p riva te  investm ent as a percentage o f G DP increased  from  11.48 (1948-49) to 
17.35 in  1970-71.
(2) Sou th  Korean expo rts  rose from  2% o f  G DP in  1953 to 3% in  1960 and 36% in  1976.
S ource: Statistical Year Book of the UN, 1964 and 1975 ed itions.
mode of production.
Table B gives the basis for assessing 
whether disproportionate rates of growth 
in productive capacity and demand 
during the long boom were a major 
contributing factor to the end of the long 
boom  and the relative stagnation of the 
1970s—80s.
Table B shows that during the long 
boom there were significant increases in 
productive capacity. Thus, for the 24 
OECD countries investment rose from 
18% of G D P in 1950 to 23.8% in 1970. 
The increase in productive capacity was 
probably much greater than shown in the 
table: because o f advances in technology, 
$lm . (at constant prices) spent on capital 
equipment in 1970 would have increased 
productive capacity by much more than 
$ lm. spent on capital equipment in 1950.
Significant declines in consumption as 
a percentage o f G D P occurred during the 
long boom: e.g. for the 24 OF.CD 
countries consumer spending averaged 
70.73% of G D P in 1950 and 60.2% of 
G D P in 1970.
Australia shows similar trends in these 
variables. (Thus these years saw a vast 
increase in productive capacity in 
Australia, particularly in manufacturing. 
What o f demand for the product? In 
1948-49 Australia's consumer spending 
was 70.73% of GDP. After 1948-49 there 
was a continuing decline in this 
percentage to 60.53% in 1970-71.1 
How important was this uev-nne in 
consumer spending as a percentage of 
GDP? In 1970-71 Australia's G D P was 
$33,649 million. If consumer spending 
was still 70% of G D P (as in 1948-49) then 
consumer spending would have been 70% 
of $33,649 million — or $23,554 million. 
In fact consumer spending in 1970-71 was 
$20,402 million. So the decline in 
consumer spending as a percentage of 
G D P in those years meant a decline in 
consumption by 1970-71 of $3,152 
million. To get this decline in perspective, 
in 1970-71 A u stra lia 's  p rim ary  
production was valued at $2,042 million 
and its mining production at $1,057 
million. Thus in the 1950s and 60s there
Were significant increases in Australia's 
productive capacity — with rapid 
industrialisation. And a decline in 
consumer spending as a percentage of 
G DP that was approximately equal to 
the value in 1970-71 of Australia's 
primary and mineral production.
South Korea is o f special significance 
because it is representative o f the newly 
industrialsied countries. Multinational 
corporations are often seen as planning a 
new international division of labour with 
manufactures transferred progressively 
to low wage, high technology third world 
countries. Table B gives some idea o f the 
reality behind this "planning". Between 
1953 and 1976 investment for South 
Korea increased from 8% of G D P to 
26%; in the same period consumer 
spending declined from 82% of G D P to 
65%. This is the typical, if exaggerated, 
pettern o f capitalist development. 
Assuming only a home market, the only 
outcome o f this pattern of development 
w o u ld  be o v e r p r o d u c t io n .  T he  
multinationals anticipated this result and
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hence placed emphasis on developing 
"export zones" for manufacturers in 
Asian countries. South Korea's exports 
increased from 2% of G D P in 1953 to 
36c/o in 1976. The growth in exports on 
this basis of superexploitation could only 
increase the excess capacity problems in 
the industrialised countries including 
Australia.
A further example will illustrate this 
point. Table B shows that capital 
formation in Japan increased from 17% 
of G D P in 1950 to 35% in 1970 — it more 
than doubled. This was a basic factor in 
the Japanese 'miracle' o f rapid economic 
growth o f the 1950s-60s. Over the same 
years consumer spending for Japan 
declined from 61% of G D P to 51%. The 
co n tra d ictio n  betw een the rapid 
ex p an sion  o f  p rod u ctive cap acity  
and the decline in consumption as a 
percentage o f output has helped to bring 
the Japanese miracle or rapid economic 
growth to an end. The search for markets 
has contributed to Japan modifying her 
rigidly anti-communist stand in regard to 
China and the USSR. At present, Japan's 
GDP is increasing in real terms at about 
2% a year.
In su m m ary , T a b le  B sh o w s  
productive capacity as expanding much 
more rapidly than consumer demand. 
Four recessions during the long boom  
showed the tendency to overproduction. 
During the 1950-60s "offsetting factors" 
to this tendency, such as rapid 
industrialisation and the expansion of 
government sector were dominant. With 
the scaling down of the Viet Nam war 
around 1970 the contradictions leading 
to long-term relative stagnation again 
became dominant.
TNew' and 'Old' factors which 
led to the present stage o f 
capitalism
There are significant differences 
between the competitive capitalist of 
Marx's day, the m onopoly enterprise of 
the 1930s and the m u ltin a tion a l 
corporation of today. Capital has 
become international in its operations 
while retaining a "base".in developed 
countries such as USA. Examples o f this 
are seen in capital moving offshore to 
industrialise low-wage Third World 
countries, General M otors world car 
with its threat particularly to the 
Australian component parts industry, 
and "tax havens" to escape company tax. 
The multinationals seek to control each 
economy in their interests. Thus at the 
April Summit a clash developed among 
em p lo y ers . M in in g  and b a n k in g  
interests, headed by Sir Rod Carnegie, 
took a hard line based on reduced wages 
to restore profits, and reduced levels of 
protection for Australian manufacturing 
industry. The embattled manufacturing 
industry, and small business interests, 
were prepared to compromise on wages
and they were sympathetic to a more 
expansionary policy. They know from 
experience that the central problem is 
excess capacity relative to demand.
Thus the multinationals introduce 
"new" contradictions. But they remain 
capitalist enterprises. As such they 
exacerbate the "old" contradictions. 
Thus on the supply side they have the 
vast resou rces to accelerate the 
development and use of advanced 
tech n o lo g y . E xp an d in g  p roductive  
capacity requires an expanding market. 
B ut on  th e  d em a n d  s id e  th e  
multinationals use their power to resist 
the rate o f growth in wages and salaries, 
assisted in this by inflation. Apart from 
measures to advance their interests, they 
favor "small government". It is shown 
a b o v e  th a t  . in  th e  m o n o p o ly ­
multinational stage of capitalism you get 
periods of stagnation such as the 30s and 
today — as well as the trade cycle.
It is important not to ignore, or to 
exaggerate, the significance o f the "new" 
factors:
employment in manufacturing has 
continued into the 1980s.
Measures to increase research in 
Australia and development of new 
industries are to be welcomed — 
p a r t ic u la r ly  if  th ere  is u n io n  
p artic ip ation . But the d eclin e in 
em p loym en t in m anufactu ring in 
industrialised countries, including those 
most advanced, throws doubts on 
theories that concentrate on the special 
features o f Australian manufactures only 
and see in crea sed  in te r n a tio n a l  
competitiveness as the way out.
The implications o f the present 
stage o f capitalism
What of the future?
We are at the beginning o f a new 
technological revolution. This gives 
society a choice. With private profit as 
the aim, experience already indicates that 
technological advances will result in 
mounting social problems, the most 
obvious of which is rising levels of
We now come to the long term stages in capitalist development. The 
second world war brought the 1930's depression to an end. The war 
was followed by the long boom of the 1950s, 1960s. Four economic 
crises during this period showed that there were still tendencies to 
over-production.
*on capital moving offshore between 
1963 and 1976 exports o f manufactures 
from Third World countries increased 
from 5.9% to 8.26% of the world export 
of manufactures.3 But in the same period 
the share of OECD countries in the world 
export o f manufactures increased from 
80.49% to 82.76%. The production and 
export of manufactured goods is still 
centred in the industrialised countries 
such as the US A. Increased exports from 
low wage, high technology Third World 
countries can only increase the gap 
betw een  p rod u ctive cap acity  and 
demand in the industrialised countries. 
The problems of the Australian clothing, 
textile, footwear industries illustrate this 
point.
*T he d ec lin e  in em p loym en t in 
Australian manufacturing industry is 
often attributed to special features of the 
Australian econom y such as small 
market and a high cost structure — or to 
capital moving to the more profitable 
resource area. These are factors in the 
r e la t iv e  d e c l in e  in A u s tr a lia n  
manufacturing industry.
At the same time it has to be noted that 
in the OECD area the numbers employed 
in manufacturing declined from 74.8 
million in 1974 to 7 1 .1 million in 1977 — 
a decline of 3.5 million in three years. 
West Germany and Japan have been 
amongst the leaders in economic growth 
and the application of advanced 
technology. In both cases the decline in
unemployment.
Today a series of intermediate demands 
and movements in areas such as 
social wage, education, child care, 
poverty, quality o f life issues relevant to 
the environment, urban renewal, concern 
about the results o f work — raise issues 
that are important in themselves, 
consistent with the present and future 
level o f development o f the productive 
forces, and point in the direction o f a 
society in which the motive force for 
productive activity will be the meeting of 
human needs.
NOTES:
I. This treatm ent is based on K. Marx, 
Capital, volume 3, Ch. 15, particularly pages 
238-240. (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977.)
2. P. Samuelson, Ecoomics, 11th ed., p. 204. 
(On p. 189 Samuelson has a table showing 
consum ption as a percentage of national 
income declining from 88.9% in 1929 to 78.2% 
in 1978!)
3. OECD, The Impact o f  the Newly 
Industrialising Countries on the Production 
and Trade in Manufactures, p. 19
Charles S ilver is a retired- school 
teacher from  VJctoria.
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